For a long time, Arabs adopted the notion that peace was their only strategic choice.
Within this context, I find myself compelled to revisit the topic of “Arab Peace as the only Strategic Choice,” as it has been one of the means relied upon to withstand the Palestinian earthquake. However, it appeared as a massive machine of which no one knew its components or how to use it to achieve its purpose and prevent the destructive effects of the earthquake. Initially, I affirm the common misconception that this implies Arabs abandoning fighting or resistance. To this, I add the following:
Human beings seek happiness, prosperity, and a good life. However, achieving these goals often requires adopting means that sometimes contradict them. Men suffer and endure hardships to make a living, yet these struggles are a means to achieving happiness and prosperity.
Peace as a strategic choice is indisputable, but attaining it requires war-like options among numerous alternatives, some of which may seem contradictory to the nature of peace but become essential conditions for its realization.
Armed resistance is not merely a legitimate right for oppressed peoples but an essential means without which people cannot obtain any of their rights. History confirms that forcibly seized rights can only be imagined to be regained through the same means.
Exaggerating political negotiation mechanisms entrenched power dynamics on the ground. Here, I point out another common mistake when assessing Egyptian-Israeli negotiations as an example to be applied to Palestinian/Israeli negotiations.
The Egyptian/Israeli negotiations followed a period of thirty years of intense wars, amidst a balance achieved through attrition and crossing the Suez Canal war in 1973, which provided a relative equilibrium in the negotiation environment.
Israel, for strategic reasons, has sought peace with Egypt since its inception, aiming at neutralizing its weight and role in the region.
The goal of occupying Sinai was not merely to acquire that land but to break the revolutionary Egyptian regime. Thus, as most recently revealed by secret documents, Israel was willing to withdraw from Sinai immediately after the war ended, only requiring Egypt’s agreement to end the state of war.
The presence of the Egyptian people in itself does not pose a threat to Israel’s existence, unlike the existence of the Palestinian people, which denies the existence of the state of Israel, posing a lingering danger in the Israeli collective consciousness.
Negotiations with Egypt aimed for a full return of national territory in Sinai, while Oslo and its aftermath did not establish a minimum threshold for Palestinian demands. Israel secured the recognition of its statehood from the outset and, through a mix of pressure and force, attempted to maximize its demands.
What was termed “step-by-step policy” in the Egyptian/Israeli negotiations was clear in terms of location and timing, without unresolved issues hanging over vague future conditions.
Thus, Sharon’s cancellation of the Oslo Agreement and the aftermath, whether in reality or legally, introduced a new hope for modifying the Palestinian/Israeli negotiation equation. Gradualism can only be accepted within a specific timeframe for a comprehensive deal, including minimum boundaries set at the June 4, 1967 borders, with Jerusalem, and the principle of removing all settlements in the occupied territories.
It does not mean disregarding other issues such as the Palestinian Authority’s stance and its relations with other Palestinian factions, the issue of national unity, the problem of resistance, the role of Arab states and their strategy, and relations with foreign powers, especially the United States, and the dialectic relationship with the Israeli society.
It is time for the Arab political mentality to emerge from the rubble of the recent earthquake with more strength and determination than its state after previous earthquakes. This recent earthquake is a turning point in Arab history, and our approach to it will determine the fate of future generations. If Israelis consider the problem to be a conflict of existence rather than a border dispute, then it cannot mean anything else to us. Either we exist or we do not.
